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CASES

A. Hite v. Falcon Partners
Lessors brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to terminate
several oil and gas leases executed in 2002 and 2003.' The leases' habendum clause provided for a primary term of one year and a secondary term continuing so long as lessee produced oil or gas, there were
production operations on the leasehold, or lessee tendered delay
rental payments. 2 Assignee-lessees made delay rental payments but
did not make any efforts to drill any wells on the leaseholds.3 The
trial court granted summary judgment for lessors on the grounds that
leases would not be construed to create a perpetual term unless the
1. See Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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intention is clear and unequivocal.' The Superior Court initially noted
that an oil and gas lease conveys an inchoate interest that becomes
vested as a fee simple determinable upon production.' The court then
affirmed, holding that delay rental payments could not hold the leases
during the secondary terms, relying heavily on the rationale that the
purpose of a lease is to promote the development of the leasehold.6
The court additionally held that to find that a lease can be held indefinitely by delay rental payments was inconsistent with the nature of a
lease as a fee simple determinable, because it only becomes such a
vested interest when production in paying quantities is achieved.'
Hoffman v. Arcelormittal Pristine Resources, Inc.
A surface owner brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration that she was the owner of the oil and gas.' Defendants
took title from a prior owner who had conveyed the property in 1928
reserving "all gas and oil within and underlying [the] premises."'
Plaintiff's deed specifically excepted and reserved "coal, oil and gas,
and other minerals."10 Plaintiff nonetheless executed oil and gas
leases in 1971, 1981, and 2006.11 Plaintiff argued that "all gas" referred only to gas in sandstone formations and not shale formations.
Plaintiff cited U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, which held that coalbed methane gas is owned by the severed coal owner.12 In Hoge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "[w]e find implicit in the
reservation of the right to drill through the severed coal seam for 'oil
and gas' a recognition of the parties that the gas which was generally
known to be commercially exploitable."" Plaintiff used this rationale
to argue that because Marcellus shale mining was not commercially
exploitable at the time of the 1928 Deed, then the language in the
1928 Deed reserving rights to "all oil and gas" is somehow ambiguous,
B.

4. See id. at 947-48.
5. Id. at 945 (citing Calhoon v. Neely, 50 A. 967, 968 (Pa. 1902); Burgan v. S.
Penn Oil Co., 89 A. 823, 826 (Pa. 1914); Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 A. 207, 208
(Pa. 1909)).
6. Id. at 948 ("To find as Falcon urges, that it may pay delay rental indefinitely,
thereby denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to reap the financial benefits of actual production, would be contrary to the decisions of our Courts, at odds with the presumed
intention of the parties in executing the leases in the first place, and in stark contrast
to the clear opinion of the courts of Pennsylvania that the obligation to pay delay
rentals is intended to 'spur the lessee toward development."') (citing Jacobs v. CNG
Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 789 (W.D. Pa. 2004)).
7. Id. at 949-50 (quoting Jacobs, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 791).
8. Hoffman v. Arcelormittal Pristine Res. Inc., No. 11cv0322, 2011 WL 1791709,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2011).
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *4-5 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Pa.
1983)).
13. Id. at *5 (quoting Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1385).
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and that "the intent of the parties was to except and reserve only the
geological formations capable of the production of natural gas with
then existing technology."14
The district court found that the reservation of "all gas" was unambiguous, relying on the interpretational principle that all the words
must be given effect." The court then distinguished Hoge in part
based on the fact that in Hoge the mineral estate was subdivided between the coal owner and the oil and gas owner.'6
The court also rejected plaintiff's adverse possession claim, following the general rule that when there has been a severance of a mineral
estate, it can only be adversely possessed by production of the mineral
for the applicable statutory period." The court cited a prior Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court case involving oil and gas rights,' 8 as
well as cases in other jurisdictions with a history of oil and gas production.19 The court granted summary judgment for the Defendants.2 0
C. Lauchle v. Keeton Group LLC
Lessor plaintiffs brought an action to invalidate oil and
under Pennsylvania's Minimum Royalty Act for permitting
of post-production costs. 2 ' The claim was subsequently
upon defendants' motions under Rule 12(b)(6), following

gas leases
deduction
dismissed
the Penn-

sylvania Supreme Court's decision in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services,

Inc.2 2 Operator defendants filed a counter-claim for equitable tolling
of the leases' primary terms during the litigation.2 3 Defendants argued that the declaratory judgment actions initiated by plaintiffs
forced them to forego operations on the subject properties due to uncertainty about the validity of the leases, depriving them of the benefits of each lease's full term.2 4

14. Id.
15. Id. (citing Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 402 (Pa. 1960)).
16. Id. ("The facts in this case are distinguishable from Hoge because in the instant the mineral estate was not subdivided, and there are not multiple parties with
different and potentially conflicting interests in the same mineral estate. In this case,
the 1928 Deed, which the parties agree is controlling, reserves and excepts all subsurface oil and gas rights to the predecessor of ArcelorMittal Pristine.").
17. Id. at *6 (citing Plummer v. Hillside Coal & Iron Co., 28 A. 853, 853 (Pa.
1894); Shaffer v. O'Toole, 964 A.2d 420, 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).
18. Id. (citing Thomas v. Oviatt, 5 Pa. D. & C.4th 83, 83 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1989)).
19. Id. (citing Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex.
2003); Schaneman v. Wright, 470 N.W.2d 566, 577 (Neb. 1991); Piney Oil & Gas Co. v.
Scott, 79 S.W.2d 394, 401 (Ky. 1934); Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316, 317 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1921, no writ)).
20. Id. at *8.
21. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 33 (West 1996).
22. Lauchle v. Keeton Grp. LLC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 757, 758 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing
Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010)).
23. Id. at 760.
24. Id.
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Plaintiff cited Derrickheim v. Holm, a Pennsylvania Superior Court
case to argue that the action to invalidate the leases did not constitute
a repudiation of the leases.25 In Derrickheim,a lessee stopped drilling
operations once they became aware of a cloud in the title of the lessor,
and did not resume activities until the cloud was judicially determined.2 6 The Superior Court reversed the trial court's initial order
that the term of the lease was equitably tolled, holding that "since oil
and gas was not being produced in paying quantities, the lease did not
continue to run past the primary term of four years. The fact that it
was 'prudent' for [lessee] to suspend operations upon learning of the
cloud on the title does not justify disregarding the express language of

the lease." 2 7
Defendants attempted to distinguish Derrickheim by emphasizing
that in this case litigation was initiated by the lessors themselves and
was tantamount to a repudiation of the lease. Defendants relied on
established authority in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana.28 The court
ignored these arguments, emphasizing that the lease challenge was initially meritorious, citing the lessee's traditional role in drafting leases
and insisting that equitably extending the leases would discourage lessors from bringing meritorious challenges to leases. 29 The court
granted the lessors' cross-motion for summary judgment. 0
D.

Pinebrook Minerals, LLC v. Anadarko E & P Co., LP

Lessor-assignee brought a declaratory judgment action to invalidate
oil and gas leases. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim as (a)
being barred by the statute of limitations; (b) failing to state a claim
that lessor's officers acted ultra vires by executing the lease; (c) ratification; and (d) failure to join a necessary party.
The Magistrate Judge held that the four-year statute of limitations
applicable to contracts under 42 Pennsylvania Constitutional Statute
section 5525 applied to a lease dispute under the catchall provision
under section 5525(a)(8).3 2 However, the Magistrate Judge held that
plaintiff lessor-assignee had no notice of the lease dispute until its as25. Id. at 760-61 (citing Derrickheim v. Holm, 451 A.2d 477, 479-80 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982)).
26. Derrickheim, 451 A.2d at 479-80.
27. Lauchle, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (quoting Derrickheim, 451 A.2d at 480).
28. Id. (citing Rougon v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. La. 1983);
Barby v. Cabot Petroleum Corp., 944 F.2d 798, 799-800 (10th Cir. 1991); Cheyenne
Res., Inc. v. Criswell, 714 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ)).
29. Id. at 762.
30. Id.
31. Pinebrook Minerals, LLC v. Anadarko E&P Co. LP, No. 4-11-CV-00177, 2011
WL 3584783, at *1, *2 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2011).
32. Id. at *3, *4.
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signment on June 17, 2010, and thus the January 2011 complaint was
filed within the limitations period.
Defendant argued that plaintiff failed to state claim that the lease
was ultra vires because it could rely on lessor-assignor's officers' apthe lease under section 5506 of the Nonparent authority to execute
profit Corporation Law.3 4 Plaintiff argued that section 5506 does not
apply to the conveyance of real property interests. The Magistrate
Judge held that a lease was both a contract and a conveyance of property." The Magistrate Judge further held that section 5503(b) similarly permitted grantees of real property interests to rely on apparent
authority, and that plaintiff had no standing to challenge the conveyance as ultra vires under section 5505 (providing that by-laws are of
no effect on third parties without notice of their provisions).3 6
The Magistrate Judge held that there was insufficient evidence in
the complaint of plaintiff's ratification because recitals in the assignment of lease were not binding judicial admissions under Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(d)(2).11 The Magistrate Judge also concluded that
lessor-assignor was a necessary party who should have been joined
under FRCP 19(a)(1) as a party whose joinder would not deprive the
court of subject matter jurisdiction and whose absence created a risk
that defendant would incur double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations in regard to lessor-assignor." Accordingly, the Magistrate
Judge recommended that the court grant defendant's motion to
dismiss.
E. Dufour v. Carizzo Oil & Gas, Inc.
Lessors brought an action for unpaid bonus payments after a signed
lease was subsequently rejected by lessee on grounds of title defect.40
The court found that a subsequent delay rental payment tendered by
lessee and a lease addendum providing that payment could only be
withheld for a cloud on title after judicial determination of a defect
were sufficient to state a claim for breach of a contract between the
parties. 41 However, an additional fraud claim was barred by the gist
33. See id. at *4.
34. See id. at *4, *5; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5506 (West Supp. 2011).
35. Pinebrook Minerals, LLC, 2011 WL 3584783 at *5 (citing Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)).
36. Id. at *6; see also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5503(b), 5505 (West Supp.

2011).
37. Id. at *8 (citing Parlette v. Palumbo, 68 Pa. D. & C. 374, 378 (Pa. Mun. Ct.
1949)).
38. Id. at *9-10.
39. Id. at *10.
40. Dufour v. Carizzo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-00013, 2011 WL 1136801, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2011).
41. Id. at *4.
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of the action doctrine because it was solely based on the failure to
make the bonus payment.4 2
F. Shafer v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC
Landowners filed a breach of contract action relating to unpaid oil
and gas lease payments.4 3 Lessee brought a motion to dismiss the
claim, arguing that plaintiff insufficiently alleged a breach of contract
because: (1) the documents demonstrate that no contract was formed,
as defendant never manifested its assent to enter into a contract; (2)
even if a contract was formed, defendant did not breach it because
there was an express condition precedent (i.e., "management approval") to defendant's duty to make the bonus payment; and (3) the
contract is unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds.44 Defendants cited three prior cases dismissing similar claims for lease bonus
payments.4 5
The court held that the lack of signature was not determinative of
defendant's intent to contract.4 6 The court further cited a statement in
the letter above landowners' signature line that "LESSOR: ACCEPTS AND AGREES" as evidence of an accepted offer from the
defendant. 47 The court held that the statute of frauds was an affirmative defense that could not be raised in an initial motion to dismiss,
and furthermore that the landman's typewritten name on the letter
could constitute a signature. 48 The court then accordingly denied the
motion to dismiss. 49

II. STATUTES
Act 2 of 2011, P.L. 7, No.2 ("Act"), effective May 13, 2011, makes
several substantive changes to the Coal and Gas Resource Coordination Act ("Coordination Act").5 0
The Act provides for 2,000 foot spacing between "well cluster,"
which is defined as the no larger than 5,000 square foot area of a well
42. Id. at *6.
43. Shafer v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-1142, 2011 WL 677479,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2011).
44. See id. at *3.
45. Id. (citing Hollingsworth v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:CV-09-0838,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100371 (M.D. Pa. July 29, 2009); Hollingsworth v. Range Res.Appalachia, LLC, 3:CV-09-0838, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100371 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28,
2009); Lyco Better Homes, Inc. v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, 4:09-CV-00249, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110425 (M.D. Pa. May 21, 2009)).
46. Id. at *4 (citing Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 584
(3d Cir. 2009)).
47. Id. at *5.
48. Id. (citing Blumer v. Dorfman, 289 A.2d 463, 468 (Pa. 1972); Flight Sys., Inc. v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 112 F.3d 124,127-29 (3d Cir. 1997)).
49. Id.
50. Act of May 13, 2011, 2011 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2011-2 (West); 58 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN.

§§ 501-518 (West 1996 & Supp. 2011).
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pad intended to host multiple horizontal wells." This change resolves
the uncertainty under the prior act as to whether the 1,000 foot spacing for wells barred having more than one horizontal well on a single
well pad overlying workable coal. In addition, the change creates
greater spacing in between well clusters than between vertical wells.52
Under the amended section 6, the Act adds a requirement that any
person applying for a drilling permit must forward, by certified mail, a
copy of the well plat to the coal owner if coal rights have been severed
from the surface where the well is to be drilled or altered, regardless
of whether the coal seam is workable." The Act now requires that oil
and gas operators provide the coal owner with a copy of the portion of
any well bore deviation survey obtained in a well between the surface
and to a point below the deepest known coal seam encountered during the drilling operation.5 4 This provision supersedes in part the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision in Foundation Coal
Resources, Corp. v. DEP, which held that DEP lacked the authority to
require an oil and gas operator to provide such surveys to coal

owners. 55

An operator has to obtain the consent as to well location from all
owners of an operating coal mine that will be penetrated by the well.5"
This would not necessarily be consequential alone, but because the
definition of an operating coal mine has been broadly expanded to
include any part of a workable coal seam covered by a mining permit,
the effect is quite significant (formerly an "operating coal mine" only
included a mine that had actively produced coal in the previous twelve
months or a mine to be established within one year).
The Act expands the definition of "active coal mine" to include
"the area of the workable coal seam which may reasonably be expected to be mined and permitted for mining by the operator during
the five-year period beyond the projected completion of the mining of
the currently permitted area."5 This is significant because the owner
of an active coal mine has the right to file objections to the issuance of
a well permit under section 12. Previously, under the Oil and Gas
Act a coal owner only had standing to object to an oil and gas well
51. § 507(d), (f) (West Supp. 2011).
52. Id. § 507(c)-(d).
53. Id. § 506(g).
54. Id. § 506(e).
55. Found. Coal Res. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 993 A.2d 1277, 1286 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2010).
56. § 506(f).
57. See 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 502 (West 1996), amended by 58 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 506 (West Supp. 2011).
58. § 502 (West Supp. 2011).
59. Id. § 512.
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permit that would pass through a "projected and platted" area of a
coal mine that was not yet being operated.o
III. REGULATIONS
41 Pa. Bulletin 805 (adopted October 12, 2010) amends Department
of Environmental Protection regulations under 25 Pa. Code Chapter
78 regulating well construction pursuant to the Oil and Gas Act. 1
The amended regulations increase cementing standards, 62 mandate
quarterly mechanical inspections of wells, 3 require operators who
damage water supply to restore or replace the water supply, 64
heighten requirements for blow-out preventers,6 increase well casing
requirements,'6 6 mandate gas migration response procedures,' and increase reporting requirements upon well completion to include, inter
alia, information on chemicals used for well stimulation and total
water volume used. 8
60. See Foundation Coal, 993 A.2d at 1287.
61. 41 Pa. Bull. 805 (Oct. 12, 2010); see also 25 PA. CODE § 78 (West, Westlaw
through Pa. Bull., Vol. 41, Num. 48, Nov. 26, 2011).
62. 25 PA. CODE §§ 78.83, 78.83b, 78.83c, 78.85.
63. Id. § 78.88.
64. Id. § 78.51(a).
65. Id. § 78.72.
66. Id. §§ 78.73, 78.81, 78.83, 78.83c, 78.84.
67. Id. § 78.89.
68. Id. § 78.122.
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